State of the field: Why novel prediction matters by Magnus, P.D. & Douglas, Heather
University at Albany, State University of New York
Scholars Archive
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship Philosophy
12-2013
State of the field: Why novel prediction matters
P.D. Magnus
University at Albany, State University of New York, pmagnus@albany.edu
Heather Douglas
University of Waterloo, heather.douglas@uwaterloo.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/
cas_philosophy_scholar
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
Recommended Citation
Magnus, P.D. and Douglas, Heather, "State of the field: Why novel prediction matters" (2013). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 23.
http://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar/23
1 
State of the field: Why novel prediction matters 
Heather Douglas and P.D. Magnus 1 
ABSTRACT: 
There is considerable disagreement about the 
epistemic value of novel predictive success, i.e. 
when a scientist predicts an unexpected 
phenomenon, experiments are conducted, and the 
prediction proves to be accurate. We survey the 
field on this question, noting both fully articulated 
views such as weak and strong predictivism, and 
more nascent views, such as pluralist reasons for 
the instrumental value of prediction. By 
examining the various reasons offered for the 
value of prediction across a range of inferential 
contexts (including inferences from data to 
phenomena, from phenomena to theory, and from 
theory to framework), we can see that neither 
weak nor strong predictivism captures all of the 
reasons for valuing prediction available. A third 
path is presented, Pluralist Instrumental 
Predictivism; PIP for short. 
 
Imagine three scientists. The first uses her theory to make a novel 
prediction, tests it, and the prediction is successful, garnering support 
for her theory. The second collects some evidence, and then alters her 
theory to accommodate the evidence. The third secretly gathers some 
evidence in her lab, accommodates her theory to the evidence, then 
publicly makes a prediction using her new theory that the evidence she 
already gathered will obtain (which it does again). The third scientist is 
obviously deceiving people about something; more than that, the 
deception seems to undercut the legitimacy of her results. As Gardner 
writes, it seems that lying about whether one had actually predicted or 
only accommodated evidence “would be a form of scientific dishonesty 
akin to fabricating experimental results” (Gardner, 1982, p. 11). But 
why should the third scientist’s misbehaviour seem relevant to the 
evidential status of her results?  A natural answer is that she is 
                                                
1 This paper was entirely collaborative, and authors are listed in 
alphabetical order. 
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pretending to more epistemic warrant than she has, but this only makes 
sense if mere accommodation does not provide as much support for the 
theory as prediction. Thus, our reaction to the third scientist depends in 
part on whether we think that the first scientist has better support for 
her theory than the second. 
The intuition that the first scientist does in fact have better support 
for her theory than the second or third is the intuition of predictivism, 
the idea that successful predictions generally provide better epistemic 
support than merely accommodating the evidence. Predictivists will say 
that the first scientist has the best support for her theory, and that the 
third scientist has done something horribly dishonest, not just ethically 
but epistemically. The opposing view, accommodationism, holds that 
there is no epistemic difference between the three scientists and the 
third scientist lied only about incidental things, not about anything 
epistemically significant. The question is not just which view is right 
— predictivism or accommodationism — but why and in what 
contexts. 
Predictivism in any form requires consideration not just of the 
available body of relevant evidence but also how and when that 
evidence was gathered. Thus, one can think of predictivism as a form 
of scientific assessment that requires some historical understanding of 
how a scientific claim was developed and tested. This enters into the 
long-standing debate between (on the one hand) those who view the 
epistemic support for theories as resting solely with the logical 
relationship between evidence and theory and (on the other hand) those 
who view epistemic support as resting at least in part with how the 
theory was developed and tested. As Musgrave (1974) noted, Leibniz, 
Whewell, and Duhem all subscribed to the idea that predicting data was 
ceteris paribus better than accommodating it, while Mill and Keynes 
disagreed (Musgrave, 1974, pp. 1–2; see also Maher, 1988, p. 1). 
Concern over novel predictions has been embedded in particular 
debates, but has also emerged as a philosophical topic in its own right. 
In the 1970s, the debate centered on the Lakatosian idea that only novel 
predictions made a program “progressive” (Lakatos, 1978). With such 
a strong requirement for novel predictions, much discussion concerned 
what counted as “novel.” Philosophers from Zahar (1973) to Gardner 
(1982) argued against the requirement of temporal novelty in which 
prediction must be made before evidence gathered. In order to maintain 
‘prediction’ as paramount while still accommodating philosophical 
intuitions and the history of science, the intuitive concept of novelty as 
temporal was replaced with heuristic or use-novelty. Evidence counts 
as a use-novel prediction of a theory if the scientist did not use 
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knowledge of the evidence in constructing the theory. Such expansion 
in the meaning of novelty came at a price. It is relatively easy to 
determine whether a prediction was temporally novel; deceptions of the 
kind in the our opening paragraph are rare. It is more difficult to assess 
use-novelty; see sec. 3.2, below. 
By the 1980s, the debate shifted away from Lakatosian accounts of 
theory change and assessments of research programmes to whether 
formal theories of confirmation (especially Bayesian) could 
accommodate predictivist intuitions and to what role novel predictions 
could play in the debates about realism. The discussion on Bayesian 
methods and predictivist intuitions flourished to such an extent that by 
the mid-1990s, all possible positions on the role of predictivism within 
Bayesian confirmation theory had been defended.2 
Predictivism, as both its own term and within the frame of the 
current debate, emerged in the late 1980s (Maher, 1988). Rather than 
focusing on debates about theory change, confirmation theories, or 
realism, the question of whether and to what extent successful novel 
prediction conferred stronger epistemic weight became its own topic of 
discussion. Since the late 1980s, the debate has centered largely on the 
following terrain: First, predictivists largely agree that accommodated 
evidence does provide some epistemic support.3 So novel prediction is 
not the only way to gain epistemic support, as it was for the 
Lakatosians. What predictivists argue is that prediction provides more 
or better epistemic support than accommodation. Second, novel 
prediction is now taken roughly to mean heuristic or use-novelty; the 
question is whether scientists considered the already known evidence 
when constructing the theory: If they did, they performed an 
accommodation. If not, their theory successfully ‘predicted’ the 
evidence (even though the evidence was already available). Because 
the view that only novel predictions provide epistemic support is no 
                                                
2 Brush writes that “philosophers have defended all four possible 
positions: Bayesian analysis is (i) valid because it favors novel 
prediction, (ii) valid because it does not favor novel predictions, 
(iii) invalid because it favors novel predictions, and (iv) invalid 
because it does not favor novel predictions” (Brush, 1994, p. 134). 
3 The question of what kind of support and support of what can vary. 
Thus, Worrall argues that accommodated evidence only supports a 
particular version of a theory if scientists have already accepted the 
more general version of the theory and that accommodated 
evidence provides no support for the general version of the theory. 
(Scerri and Worrall, 2001, p. 425–6) 
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longer on the table, predictivists do not need to worry as much about 
the problems of assessing when a case is prediction or accommodation. 
If it is hard to tell whether a scientist made a use-novel prediction or 
accommodation, we can simply presume it was an accommodation and 
then assess the strength of epistemic support qua accommodation — 
that will still count for something.  
Even with such a mild form of predictivism (in which 
accommodation counts too but just not as much, and where heuristic or 
use novelty is sufficient for ‘novel prediction’) it has still been a 
challenge to articulate why prediction is preferable to accommodation. 
Sometimes the argument is couched in naturalist terms: do scientists 
grant prediction special status or not?  This literature is interesting, as it 
shows at least in part how difficult it can be to assess a particular 
historical example and whether it supports predictivist or 
accommodationist tendencies. Key historical examples have been 
evaluated and reevaluated, making it vexed as to whether or not actors 
treated novel prediction as special. Regarding diffraction, Fresnel’s 
wave theory of light, and the bright spot, see inter alia Giere (1983) 
contra Worrall (1989). Regarding Einstein, relativity, and the 
perihelion of Mercury, see Zahar (1973) contra Earman and Glymour 
(1978). One of the most detailed debates on predictivism in the history 
of science has concerned Mendeleev and the predictions he made using 
the periodic law; see Brush (1996; 2007), Scerri and Worrall (2001), 
Worrall (2005), Scerri (2005), McIntyre (2001), Barnes (2005), and 
Schindler (2008). Despite the centrality of predictivism in the case of 
Mendeleev for Maher (1988) and Lipton (2004), it remains unclear 
whether and to what extent scientists were persuaded by predictions of 
new elements or revised atomic weights, rather than by 
accommodations of already well known chemical phenomena. Given 
the complexity of history, such uncertainty is not surprising. As Harker 
notes, “examples and counterexamples fuel, but don’t settle, the 
debates” (Harker, 2008, p. 444). In many of the key historical 
examples, both stunning novel prediction and elegant accommodation 
of previously known data occur together. This makes trying to 
determine what actually impressed scientists at the time historically 
challenging. 
This complexity points to a third possibility on the value (or not) of 
novel prediction. Many contemporary authors maintain that prediction 
is better than accommodation, but that this is not an irreducible virtue. 
Rather, prediction is good just because it reliably correlates with some 
other epistemic virtue. Such philosophers are willing to abandon 
prediction in cases where the other good is clearly in view. For 
5 
example, Harker (2008) argues that prediction just serves as a 
defeasible sign of explanatory power. Where it is possible to assess 
explanatory virtue directly, on his view, prediction is superfluous. This 
move distinguishes between strong predictivism (the view that there is 
some intrinsic value to prediction) and weak predictivism (the view 
that prediction is a surrogate for something else).4  
Finally, there is a view nascent in the literature that is orthogonal to 
the strong/weak opposition. Suppose that prediction is not an intrinsic 
epistemic virtue, but rather that it serves as an instrumental indicator. 
Yet it can be a proxy for disparate sources of epistemic assurance. So it 
does not reduce to one particular virtue (as in weak predictivism), but 
neither does it have some kind of intrinsic epistemic virtue (as in strong 
predictivism). We dub this Pluralist Instrumental Predictivism (in sec. 
5), and it is a position that can be articulated by coming to grips with 
the present state of the debate. As we proceed in this overview of the 
literature, we will focus on the recent philosophical debates on 
prediction, organizing as we go the reasons to think that novel 
prediction provides some instrumental assurance in a range of cases. 
We will then assess what this collection of reasons means for weak 
predictivism in its various guises.  
To look ahead, our survey is structured along the following lines. 
We will first structure the levels of scientific inference for which novel 
prediction can be relevant. We consider inferences from data to 
phenomena, inferences from phenomena to theory, and inferences from 
theory to framework. We distinguish these levels in the next section, 
and then proceed to examine reasons for why novel prediction might be 
useful at each level. We conclude our survey by considering what we 
have gleaned from the literature for the views of Worrall and weak 
predictivists of various stripes.  
1  Data, Phenomena, Theories, and Framework 
Before surveying the range of reasons one might value novel prediction 
in scientific practice, we distinguish four levels across which scientists 
make inferences. Making these distinctions will serve as the organizing 
basis for explicating the value of novel prediction. 
In this paper, there are four levels of concern: data, phenomena, 
theory, and framework. On the side of evidence, we draw from Bogen 
and Woodward (1988) to distinguish data from phenomena. On the 
side of theory, it is important to distinguish particular hypotheses 
                                                
4 See Harker (2008), p. 430. 
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subject to testing from broader, less-testable systems of background 
theories. We will call the former theory and the latter framework. These 
levels range from the rawest observation to the most sophisticated 
general commitments. To describe each in more detail: 
The data are raw observations, such as the individual numbers or 
points on a scatter plot. They must be “relatively easy to identify, 
classify, measure, aggregate, and analyze in ways that are reliable and 
reproducible” (Bogen and Woodward, 1988, p. 320). Particular 
observations are idiosyncratic; they are disturbed randomly by noise 
and error. 
The phenomena are the patterns in the world that are indicated by 
data, such as the true curve which underlies a scatter plot. The 
transformation of data into phenomena is a matter of statistics, data 
analysis, or data reduction. The phenomena “have stable, repeatable 
characteristics which will be detectable by means of a variety of 
different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data” 
(Bogen and Woodward, 1988, p. 317). Repeating an experiment and 
reproducing the result will not generate the same data, but it should 
provide new data that instantiate the same phenomena. 
The theory typically predicts and explains phenomena. It is general, 
in that it will apply across more than just one kind of situation and 
often ties apparently different phenomena together. One can think of 
theories as sets of models, laws, or postulated entities and causal 
relations that provide explanations and predictions of the phenomena of 
concern. 
The framework is the partly implicit background against which 
particular theories are formed. It includes auxiliary hypotheses and 
related commitments which are necessary in order for the theory to 
yield determinate predictions, such as commitments about when 
conditions or entities are the same. (As a tacit but unobjectionable 
example: It does not matter for a physics experiment which day of the 
week you do it on.) It also includes the motivation for particular 
theories along with general assumptions about the domain of 
phenomena and about how various pieces of experimental equipment 
do or do not function. 
All four levels will be prominent in at least some cases. For 
example, consider rival explanations of growth perturbations and small 
size among people raised in adverse conditions. Schell and Magnus 
(2007) describe two rival theoretical approaches. The adaptationist 
approach tries to explain scrawniness as an adaptation to harsh 
conditions. The medical approach explains it instead as a disease or 
disfunction, harm done to people by their adverse conditions. These are 
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each general frameworks (in our sense) which underwrite specific 
theories. For example, the adaptationist approach might suggest the 
hypothesis that smaller people would be better off than bigger ones 
under conditions of scarcity because they need less food. This is a 
particular theory (in our sense) and it can be tested. Schell and Magnus 
argue that this distinction is important to understanding the rivalry 
between the two approaches.5 The test of a particular hypothesis 
involves considering a large collection of specific measurements. The 
raw numbers are taken to indicate a general relation, perhaps between 
body mass, food intake, and physical performance. The raw 
measurements are the data, and the relation is the phenomenon. The 
relation is in turn used as a proxy for fitness, so the phenomenon can 
serve as evidence for or against the theory. If the theory succeeds, then 
this provides support for the framework; if it fails, then it is a demerit 
for the framework. 
Nevertheless, it may not be possible to distinguish all four levels in 
every case. For example, there might be no distinction between 
phenomena and theory for some phenomenological or statistical 
hypotheses; cf. Glymour (2000). Regardless, there are typically more 
than two levels. In what follows, we will survey various reasons in the 
literature that novel prediction underwrites — with more epistemic 
assurance than accommodation — inferences among the adjacent levels 
of the hierarchy. Different, albeit conceptually related, reasons for the 
increased epistemic assurance arise in these different contexts. 
2  Values for novel prediction 
In this section, we glean from the literature reasons that novel 
prediction provides epistemic value over and above accommodation at 
each boundary between levels — moving from data to phenomena, 
from phenomena to theory, and from theory to framework. 
Often, this value derives from the incomplete nature of our 
knowledge. Perhaps, as many have argued, the value of novel 
prediction would diminish were we to have complete epistemic clarity 
regarding the available evidence and the claims made about it. For 
example, White considers the limits of predictivism by positing 
problems that arise for agents that are “thoroughly familiar with the 
content of [the theory] and all the independent evidence supporting it” 
                                                
5 Following Lakatos, Schell and Magnus call the rival frameworks 
research programmes. 
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(White, 2003, pp. 657–8).6 Even then, it would not evaporate entirely. 
Minimally, the process of making and testing a prediction produces 
additional relevant evidence. We concede, however, that the problem 
posed from a standpoint of perfect information makes predictivism 
seem thin. The problem, it seems to us, is with the standpoint and not 
with predictivism. For those interested in the value of novel prediction 
for actual scientific practice and inference, it matters that scientists are 
never in a situation of perfect knowledge and transparency. Taking 
seriously the actual epistemic context of science, where theories are 
rarely perfectly articulated and logical vision is limited, provides a 
clearer understanding for the value of prediction over accommodation. 
We can see this across a range of inferential contexts in science. 
2.1  Data-phenomena relations: The danger of overfitting 
Fitting a curve to data requires moving from a plot of discrete, 
particular observations to a formula which correctly defines the relation 
between quantities; that is, it is a matter of using the data to figure out 
the phenomenon. As a matter of mathematics, one can almost always 
write down a high-order polynomial which passes precisely through 
each and every data point.7 Yet this is never what one actually does. It 
would be a mistake to make the curve match the data exactly, because 
we know that the phenomena do not do so. The actual data include 
error and noise. Indeed, this is one reason for the data-phenomena 
distinction. 
Instead of writing down a baroque, perfect-fit polynomial, one 
draws a simpler curve that gets pretty close to the data points. There are 
various formal methods for doing so. Sober and coauthors apply one in 
particular, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), to defend the value 
of simplicity (Forster and Sober, 1994) and novel prediction 
(Hitchcock and Sober, 2004). Given some data generated with random 
error, one can do a better job predicting future data by drawing 
something simpler than the best-fit polynomial. As the amount of data 
increases, one can justifiably draw a higher-order better-fit curve. The 
                                                
6 See also Collins (1994), p. 222. 
7 We say ‘almost always’ because there may be data points with the 
same x value but different y values, and then y cannot be 
represented as a function of x. Throwing out troublesome points, 
we might instead say: one can always write down a polynomial that 
passes through almost all of the data points. 
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AIC provides a quantitative procedure for deciding how complicated 
the curve should be. 
The connection between AIC and predicting future data makes a 
(qualified) case for predictivism. If a scientist overfits the data with a 
grotesque curve, then he will make poor predictions about future data. 
Contrapositively, if a scientist makes successful predictions, then we 
can infer that he has not overfit the data. Although AIC is easiest to 
illustrate with the example of fitting polynomial curves to plots of data, 
it readily generalizes to cases where some amount of data is treated 
with models that have some number of parameters. Too many 
parameters will be a sign of overfitting, and predictive success will be a 
sign that there are not too many parameters. AIC provides a precise 
way to determine when the amount of data is sufficient to justify the 
better fit provided by an additional parameter. Because AIC provides a 
way of determining this transparently, however, this is only a qualified 
defense of predictivism. Hitchcock and Sober argue that there is no 
further value to novel prediction once we know that AIC has been met. 
Although AIC can be applied generally to any case of fitting n-
parameter models to N points of data, such cases are only for 
inferences from data to phenomena. The examples which Hitchcock 
and Sober give underscore the fact that we are not talking about 
theories in any strong sense; e.g.:  
 Marsha measures the width of her desk with a tape measure. 
She holds the end of the tape with ‘0’ on it at one end of the 
desk, and observes that the other end of the desk coincides 
almost exactly with the line on the tape labeled ‘150’. On the 
basis of this observation, she hypothesizes that the desk is 
between 149 and 151 centimeters wide. (Hitchcock and 
Sober, 2004, p. 6, also p. 24) 
They offer this example to show that accommodation is not always 
bad; it seems OK that Marsha forms her belief about the length of the 
desk after making the measurement. The data is one measurement 
made with a tape measure; the implicit one-parameter model is just that 
the desk has a width x. The conclusion made from this measurement is 
that the actual parameter value is close to 150; that is, the desk is 
approximately as wide as it was measured to be. The width of the desk 
is a phenomenon, because it is the real value which must be inferred 
from the data. Even more general facts, like the mean width of desks on 
campus, would still be phenomena in this sense. It is far from being a 
theory of anything. The general problem of curve fitting, although 
more complex than just measuring desks, is still primarily a matter of 
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figuring out the phenomenon on the basis of data. Hitchcock and 
Sober’s argument shows at most that the advantages of novel 
prediction at this level can be replaced by the machinery of the AIC, if 
it is properly applicable.8 
Churchland (1989, esp. pp. 179–181) makes a point regarding over-
fitting which is similar to Sober et al., although in an entirely different 
formal framework. For Churchland, the data are represented by the 
input nodes of a neural network. Network weights are set by a learning 
algorithm in response to a training set of data. Each input in the 
training set has a normative output. Churchland gives the example of a 
network trained to distinguish rocks from mines based on sonar data. If 
the network has too much internal structure, the weights can effectively 
encode each input from the training set; but a network which has just 
learned the idiosyncrasies of the training set will not give correct 
outputs when faced with novel data. A network with simpler internal 
structure cannot master the training set just by encoding facts about 
each distinct data point; to succeed, it must find a general pattern. 
Although Churchland calls the representation at the hidden layer a 
‘theory’, in our terminology the general pattern is clearly the 
phenomenon. 
For Churchland — as for Sober and Forster — a needlessly 
complex account is likely to not be predictively successful because it is 
likely to have overfit the data. As such, an account that is predictively 
successful is shown not to have overfit the data and so not to be 
needlessly complex. Successful prediction is an assurance that one has 
not overfit the data, and that future predictions will also be successful. 
Such assurance is obviously very valuable in science. The question is 
whether prediction is a mere surrogate that can be generally replaced 
by a formula like AIC or an analysis of network complexity. We think 
not. Instead, novel prediction provides a crucial supplement and 
support to the proper use of tools like the AIC. Here are some reasons 
why: 
                                                
8 The adaptationist approach to growth, discussed above, illustrates 
this. It is clear how AIC might be used to identify relations 
between body mass, food intake, and physical performance. Given 
data, it can be used to identify the phenomena. Yet performance at 
specific physical tasks is used as a proxy for fitness, a term which 
appears at the theory level and which cannot be measured directly. 
It is not clear how the AIC could function at this level, in relating 
theory to phenomena. 
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First, the AIC only applies if certain assumptions hold (see Forster 
and Sober, 1994). Although the number of data points and free 
parameters can readily be counted up, we can never be entirely sure 
that the formula applies. Whether or not the assumptions needed to 
apply AIC are present cannot itself be shown by using AIC. Different, 
external assurance is required. Novel prediction can provide some of 
that assurance, showing us that AIC and how we are applying it is on 
track. 
Second, applying AIC requires dividing models into natural 
families. In the curve-fitting case, we can treat orders of polynomials as 
the families of models. Yet a high-order polynomial can be made into a 
model with one free parameter by writing in all but one of the 
coefficients. It would be perverse to do this arbitrarily, but in the 
general case of n-parameter models it may be possible to motivate 
specific values for some of the parameters. There is no formal rule for 
when this is or is not legitimate. Forster and Sober call this the 
subfamily problem. Identifying the families of legitimate models (i.e., 
solving the subfamily problem) requires constraints from what we have 
called the levels of theory and framework — levels where AIC does 
not readily apply. Appealing to AIC as grounds for thinking that 
accommodation is just as good as prediction, in a specific case, thus 
relies on background commitments which themselves cannot be based 
on AIC. Novel prediction can help provide crucial assurance that the 
way we are thinking about families of models is appropriate, thus again 
assisting with the application of AIC.  
Third, the general idea of prediction as insurance against over-
fitting does not require the AIC approach; recall that Churchland makes 
the same point in a very different formal idiom. This suggests that the 
precise judgement which AIC yields is not decisive. It is not the 
singular algorithm for determining when prediction is of no value over 
accommodation. Instead, it is one (nice and precise) way of assessing 
the assurance against over-fitting that novel prediction also generally 
supplies. Moreover, the fact that insurance against over-fitting is more 
general than AIC provides some license for appealing to novel 
predictive success where, for technical reasons, AIC does not apply. 
One may object that these are quibbles. After all, we agree with 
Hitchcock and Sober that this advantage of prediction over 
accommodation, insurance against overfitting, diminishes as the 
amount of data increases. In extreme cases, where we take phenomena 
to be established matters of fact, a prediction that the pattern will 
continue carries negligible epistemic weight (but then so does any 
additional accommodation). Measuring the length of a desk and then 
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predicting that the desk will have the same length tomorrow is 
unimpressive, because the phenomenon is entirely familiar. Where we 
need epistemic assurance is not in the cases of the familiar, but rather 
in the cases of the unfamiliar. In cases where the phenomena are not an 
entirely settled matter, confirmation of a novel prediction will always 
retain some value. Minimally, it will add evidence. Additionally, it can 
bolster our assurance that the more formal AIC approach (or some 
other formal approach) is being applied properly. And in cases of 
inference from data to phenomena that are more qualitative, to which 
AIC simply cannot apply, novel prediction can still be a source of 
assurance that we have neither oversimplified nor overfit. Novel 
prediction thus typically provides more assurance than accommodation 
in inferences from data to phenomena. 
2.2  Theory-phenomena relations: The power of relevance 
What of inferences from phenomena to the explanations and theories 
postulated to account for them?  Novel prediction offers several 
epistemic advantages over accommodation for inferences made here as 
well. 
For the purposes of this survey, we take it that theories (including 
models and laws) relate to phenomena primarily through explanatory 
relations. Explanations explain phenomena by invoking theoretical 
machinery such as causal relations and laws, and thus show how these 
theoretical ideas link up with phenomena on the ground. Theories, and 
the explanations that invoke them to explain phenomena, help us to 
conceptually organize an otherwise chaotic world of phenomena. In the 
generation of theories that identify these explanatory relations, 
accommodation plays a key role. Already-known phenomena constrain 
scientists’ creativity in generating new explanatory ideas, which are 
ultimately the source of new theories. But as with the relationship 
between data and phenomena, prediction (usually) goes one step 
further and (typically) provides additional epistemic merit.  
The close working relationship between explanation and prediction 
is central to the generation of this epistemic merit. The explanations at 
the heart of a scientific theory not only organize already known 
phenomena, they are also the tools that should be used to predict new 
phenomena. As Douglas (2009) has argued, all scientific explanations 
have cognitive aspects that enable us to move from what is postulated 
by a theory to the next novel prediction. Examining deductive-
nomological, causal, mechanistic, and unifying explanations, Douglas 
shows how each kind of explanation is the generator of predictions in a 
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well-functioning theory. Phenomena are predicted through the use of 
explanations, and the predictions then guide tests to provide evidence 
for the theory. The prediction thus plays a crucial part in testing the 
explanation and the theory of which it is a part. 
Successful novel predictions tell us several things about the 
explanations (and theories) that produced them. First, most obviously, 
novel predictions add additional pieces of directly relevant 
confirmatory evidence for the explanations. New evidence, particularly 
evidence of new relevant phenomena, is a key epistemic bonus in 
science. New evidence or new evidential relations throw an evidential 
gauntlet down for competitor theories — they must accommodate the 
new evidence or risk epistemic demerit. Accommodation is usually 
possible, but the point here is that accommodation did not produce the 
new evidence nor did it bring new evidence into the purview of the 
theory, showing that it was relevant to an area previously unconnected 
to it. 
Note that this advantage obtains even if the predicted fact was 
already known, provided it was not used in the construction of the 
theory; i.e., if the prediction was only use-novel. In such cases, the 
evidence was not connected to the particular theoretical domain before, 
not brought under any competitors’ explanations. Seeing even 
previously known evidence as relevant to a new area is an important 
explanatory and epistemic accomplishment.9 
Second, novel predictions provide some inductive ground for 
confidence in the ability of an explanation to help guide us to further 
new predictions. In turn, this can open up new evidential terrain for 
exploration. An explanation that has been used to produce a successful 
novel prediction has proven itself fruitful, giving us reason to think that 
it can help us think productively about the world. Such an explanation 
is a powerful tool, which matters greatly to scientists, who need such 
conceptual tools. Novel prediction here gives us an assurance about the 
evidential fecundity of the explanation and theory that produced it 
which accommodation cannot. Of course, this assurance is fallible. It 
might be that, next time, the explanation fails to produce successful 
novel predictions. But its past success is a modest inductive assurance.  
Third, and finally, novel prediction gives us some assurance that we 
have not fiddled around too much with our core explanatory structures 
                                                
9 If the evidence is not new to the domain, it is unlikely it would be 
use-novel. Only in cases of formal parameter setting, much 
discussed by Worrall, can good cases be made that known-to-be 
relevant evidence is indeed use-novel. More on this below. 
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to make them fit the available phenomena. (Lipton, 2004, p. 170) Just 
as projections of phenomena can be overfit to data, theories can be 
overfit to known phenomena. Unlike the curve-fitting context, 
however, there is no formal measure like AIC to help at the level of 
explanations and theories.10 Lacking such a formal measure, novel 
prediction can provide a crucial guard against overfitting. 
Accommodation provides no such assurance. Novel prediction is thus a 
potent tool for constraining our explanatory imagination, because it 
forces us to pit our favored explanations and theories against the world 
in a way that accommodation does not. Novel predictions are a crucial 
way of telling the extent to which our theories may be tuned too much 
to the available evidence and not projectable beyond it; they provide a 
piece of instrumentally valuable assurance. 
The link between explanation and prediction which gives us 
confidence in explanatory theories that successfully predict also makes 
it clearer why predictive flukes are worrisome. Predictive success 
severed from explanatory or theoretical contexts makes it very unclear 
what we are supposed to be assured about. Novel predictions provide 
assurances for the explanations and theories we use to generate those 
predictions. Divorced from this context, it is hard to know what to 
think. For example, consider coin-tossing cases. Imagine a series of 
coin tosses and a prognosticator who predicts the outcomes 
successfully, such that we do not know how the prognosticator is 
managing it. The predictive success appears free-floating and, 
plausibly, a fluke. Barnes illuminates such cases by expanding the 
example to include a whole community of coin-flipologists. If that 
community is large enough, our intuitive trust in a successful predictor 
— who now just looks like a lottery winner — drops dramatically 
(Barnes, 1996, p. 74). But specific coin toss results are data rather than 
phenomena, so consider another example. Bode’s Law was a 
mathematical formula that accommodated and then predicted the size 
of the planetary orbits, clearly phenomena rather than data. It was a 
modest predictive success before 1846, predicting the distance to 
                                                
10 It is impossible to group together classes of theories, which would 
be required to solve the relevant subfamily problem; e.g. 
Newtonian mechanics might be one or many theories, depending 
on how we organize constraints and force laws. Additionally, it is 
often not clear how to count the number of free parameters; the 
Newtonian description of a specific system has a determinate 
number of parameters, but Newtonian systems generally do not. 
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Uranus and the location of the asteroid belt.11 Without an explanatory 
theory, it was easy to think of the rule’s two predictive successes as 
flukes — particularly once Neptune was discovered, far from where 
Bode’s Law said it should be. If some mechanism had produced the 
regularity and if our theory of that mechanism also successfully 
predicted other phenomena, it would not have been dismissed so 
quickly. With both Bode’s Law and the coin tossing predictions, we 
have no theoretical or explanatory claims to which we can tie the 
predictive success.  
Contrast this with the case of Fresnel and the ability of his wave 
mechanics for light to ‘predict’ diffraction fringes.12 As Worrall (1989) 
notes, there was only one parameter to fix, the wavelength of light, to 
make the theory fit the phenomena. Once Fresnel had a measure of the 
wavelength of light he was using, he could use his mathematical theory 
of diffraction to predict diffraction fringes from any configuration, and 
very precisely. So, Fresnel’s theory can be considered to produce the 
use-novel prediction of the diffraction measurements as well as the 
novel prediction of the spot. All provided stunning support for his 
theory, and given the precision of the diffraction measurements and the 
numerous predictions made and measured there, it is not surprising the 
French Academy’s prize commission of 1819 would focus on them. 
The explanatory structure of wave interference (which causes 
diffraction patterns), made precise in Fresnel’s theory, produced novel 
and successful predictions (some use-novel, others temporally novel) 
and garnered profound support. 
Consider also the case of Mendeleev. The theoretically thin 
predictions which he made on the basis of his periodic table at least had 
the periodic law behind them — some explanatory apparatus, plus a 
plethora of diverse accommodated evidence. His predictions came 
directly out of thinking through the implications of the periodic law, 
including the revised atomic weights and additional elements (some of 
which were erroneous predictions, as Scerri and Worrall (2001, p. 439) 
point out). Initially, the noble gases were thought to be a threat to 
                                                
11 For more details, see McIntyre (2001), p. 315-316. 
12 We use cautionary quotes because it is a prediction in the use-
novel sense only; that is, he did not use the specific diffraction data 
to derive his theory. Because this is a case of precise parameter 
fixing, whether Fresnel had the specific diffraction fringe 
measurements in hand before developing the mathematics was 
irrelevant. Although a case of use-novel prediction, it illustrates the 
value of novel prediction generally. 
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Mendeleev’s theory. Yet it was quickly suggested that one needed to 
simply add another column to the periodic table to accommodate argon. 
Successful predictions of neon and other noble gases swiftly followed 
(Scerri and Worrall, 2001, p. 442–447). This case shows the tight 
relationships between accommodation, explanation, and prediction 
when the theory is working well. Minimal accommodation, when 
needed, should lead quickly to new predictions, which then bolster our 
confidence in the explanations provided. If the addition of a column to 
the periodic table had not yielded successful new predictions, it would 
have looked like an ad hoc strategy merely to save the table. Because 
of the successful predictions, it looks like a legitimate move.13 In 
scientific practice, accommodations need to prove themselves with 
additional predictions.  
Novel predictions of phenomena, predicted using the core 
explanations of a theory, provide the following epistemic goods: (1) 
new relevant phenomena are discovered and/or known phenomena are 
shown to be relevant to a theory, (2) the evidential fruitfulness of the 
explanations and their reliability in helping us navigate the world is 
demonstrated, and (3) we are assured that we have not been excessively 
creative in our development of any needed accommodations, 
explanations, and theories, i.e. that such conceptual work is not 
‘overfitted’. Accommodation has nothing to offer for (1) or (2), and it 
is worry over accommodative practices that is the reason we need 
prediction to provide assurance of kind (3). Novel predictions provide 
us with particular, if imperfect, epistemic assurance over 
accommodations when examining theories and the phenomena they try 
to explain. 
2.3  Theory-framework relations: Seeing the big picture 
Finally, consider inferences from theory to framework. 
Eric Barnes (2008) advocates a version of the realist no miracles 
argument which he dubs the ‘miraculous endorsement’ argument.14 
                                                
13 This illustrates a point we emphasize in our discussion of weak 
predictivism below: Novel prediction bolsters our confidence more 
than direct assessments of simplicity, which are contentious. In the 
Mendeleev case, was adding another column simple?  Simplicity of 
theories is a cipher, whereas the successful novel predictions can at 
least readily be seen as such. 
14 Parts of this section follow the exegesis of Barnes given by 
Magnus (2011). 
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Rather than arguing for the existence of specific phenomena or the 
truth of specific theories, the miraculous endorsement argument is 
concerned with the success of scientific practice in general. It roughly 
takes this form: Scientists make predictions which are verified. If these 
scientists were merely guessing or accommodating prior evidence, then 
this success would be an inexplicable miracle. Alternatively, this 
success could be explained by scientists’ general reliability. So 
scientists are (probably, mostly) reliable. The reliability of their 
methods only makes sense if scientists’ background theories are true. 
So those background theories are (probably, approximately) true. 
As Barnes acknowledges, this argument echoes ones made by other 
philosophers. Richard Boyd, for example, argues that the general 
reliability of the frameworks employed by scientists is the best 
explanation of their success in developing particular theories.15 Peter 
Lipton (1996) also draws a connection between reliable methods and 
true background beliefs.16 
It is important to note that the miraculous endorsement argument is 
not about a particular, predictively-successful theory. Rather, it is about 
the ability of scientists to develop such theories. It explains their ability 
in terms of the general reliability of their methods, methods which are 
reliable only because they correspond to some true beliefs. The 
argument looks not at specific, isolated theories but instead at the 
background of theories which underwrite scientific methods — that is, 
not at what we have called theories but instead what we have called 
frameworks.  
One can think of the framework as scientists’ background beliefs, 
as Barnes does when explicating his argument; he says “novel success 
is not direct evidence of theory truth — it is rather evidence for the 
credibility of the endorser. More specifically, it is evidence for the truth 
or empirical adequacy of the endorser’s background beliefs” (Barnes, 
2008, p. 140). Barnes’ claim, both in this passage and throughout his 
book, is that novel predictive success is a reason to conclude that a 
scientist is a reliable expert in her domain. This expertise will partly be 
a matter of background belief, in the sense of believing true 
propositions, but it will also be a matter of ‘background belief’ in a 
broader sense which includes approaches to theory development and 
                                                
15 See e.g. Boyd (1982); importantly, this argument is different than 
the one often called the ‘Boyd-Putnam argument’ for realism. 
16 Lipton’s argument is that judging the merits of specific theories 
requires reliable and hence approximately true background 
theories. 
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tacit commitment to reliable methods. What we have called the level of 
theory consists of explicit claims and models, but the level of 
framework consists of a less easily circumscribed raft of commitments. 
Following Barnes: if a scientist is able to generate predictively-
successful theories, then this gives us reason to trust or adopt the 
framework which she employs in doing so. Notice here that the 
relevant evidence is not merely facts about data and theories — when 
data was observed, how the theory was initially formulated, and so on. 
As Barnes emphasizes, what matters is scientists’ endorsement of 
theories which ultimately enjoy predictive success. That is what 
reflects well upon scientists’ background commitments. This is what 
Barnes calls endorsement novelty. 
Although Barnes, Boyd, and Lipton all give these arguments in the 
context of thinking about scientific realism, the assurance provided by 
novel prediction can be acknowledged while remaining neutral on the 
question of realism. Barnes recognizes that winning the day for realism 
requires solving further problems. In the passage we quote above, he 
allows for the possibility that predictive success might just be 
explained by the empirical adequacy of background theories. Instead of 
concluding that methods and commitments are truth conducive, one 
might infer instead that they are instrumentally powerful at producing 
reliable theories. 
The anti-realist can grant to Barnes that scientists should and do 
endorse theories that are predictively successful. Moreover, scientists’ 
being able to do so reflects well upon the background framework the 
scientists employ in developing these theories. Of course, the anti-
realist will insist that this only gives us reason to believe that the 
framework is empirically adequate — not that the framework’s claims 
about the unobservable world are true.17 Both realists and anti-realist 
empiricists can recognize a framework which consistently delivers 
predictive success as reliable, and both will prefer reliable frameworks 
over unreliable ones. The realist just understands reliability as the 
tendency to generate true theories, whereas the anti-realist understands 
it as the tendency to generate empirically successful theories. 
The arguments given by Barnes, Boyd, and Lipton concur in saying 
that scientists’ development of predictively successful theories reflects 
well upon scientists’ framework commitments. For them, this favorable 
light justifies belief; for the anti-realist, it justifies acceptance instead. 
In either case, novel predictive success does important epistemic and 
evidential work. The fact that a framework generates predictively 
                                                
17 This is what Barnes calls the anti-realist challenge. 
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successful theories gives us prima facie reason to adopt it or (if we 
have already adopted it) to stick with it. 
This assurance is parallel to the one that we get when a theory 
generates novel and accurate predictions of unanticipated phenomena. 
That gives us a reason to adopt or continue employing that theory. 
When a framework or research programme generates theories which 
can enjoy that kind of success, then we have a reason to adopt or 
continue employing that framework. In the example from Schell and 
Magnus (2007) discussed above, the rival adaptationist and medical 
approaches are not things that can be directly tested. Rather, they 
inform the construction of specific theories. If practitioners employing 
one framework can generate predictively successful theories but 
practitioners employing the other cannot, then we have a reason to 
prefer the former framework to the latter. Schell and Magnus diagnose 
this situation for the medical and adaptationist approaches respectively. 
Schell and Magnus draw an explicit connection to Lakatos (1978). 
Indeed, there are parallels between predictivism for theory-framework 
relations and what Lakatos called the methodology of scientific 
research programmes. To use his terminology: A research program is 
progressive if it leads to theories which underwrite novel predictions 
and if at least many of those predictions are accurate; a research 
program is degenerating otherwise. Whereas Lakatos offered this as a 
general account, suggesting that progress and degeneration were the 
only considerations for or against a research program, we offer the 
more modest claim that they do matter. Progress in Lakatos’ sense is 
both methodologically and epistemically to a framework’s credit. 
An additional element introduced by Barnes’ argument is that — 
unlike data, phenomena, or theory — a framework might be largely a 
matter of implicit commitments. Where that is so, we cannot write 
down the framework that receives credit for the scientist’s success. 
Instead, the success accrues to their tacit expertise; that is, to the 
scientist as expert. Realists and antirealists disagree about whether the 
expertise is a matter of truth or empirical reliability, but it is a 
legitimate scientific merit in either case. And it is novel prediction that 
gives us such assurance, not accommodation. 
3  Weak Predictivisms 
As noted in the introduction, defenses of novel prediction may seem 
somewhat unfashionable. Many philosophers have argued that novel 
predictive success is nothing special, that it is better understood merely 
as a guide to some other confirmatory virtue and that the exploration of 
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that other virtue is where the real philosophical action is. Other 
philosophers, most notably John Worrall, substantially reinterpret what 
counts as prediction. On Worrall’s account, the intuitive situation in 
which a scientist predicts something previously unknown becomes just 
a special case — and not even the most important case. We now turn to 
these deflationary and ersatz predictivisms. 
3.1  Would-be reduction and deflation 
Some contemporary philosophers admit that predictive success might 
seem to have some value, but they suggest that it is just indicative of 
something more important and that the importance of predictive 
success reduces to this other more important thing. 
Harker (2008) and Collins (1994) are exemplary of such views. 
Both insist that prediction is just a superficial proxy for considerations 
of explanatory unification and that the theoretical virtue, explanatory or 
unificatory power, is what really matters. Collins writes that “the 
ability of a theory to make correct new predictions is not what is 
ultimately important; rather, what is important is the theory’s general 
structural/relational features” (Collins, 1994, p. 222). Given the 
overview of the instrumental value of prediction given above, there are 
several problems with their approach to reducing the value of 
prediction. 
First, although explanatory power and unification are important 
theoretical virtues, the accounts that Collins and Harker provide fail to 
show that novel prediction’s value reduces to such virtues. While novel 
prediction may sometimes or even often accompany virtues such as 
unification, explanatory power, and simplicity, it seems possible that a 
theory could be predictively successful without exhibiting them. 
Indeed, in the early stages of theory development, novel predictive 
success may be our main indicator that there is something worth 
pursuing further. Unification can come later. The assurance novel 
prediction provides does not simply dissipate in a context where the 
other virtues are absent or contested. 
Second, the strategy of reducing novel prediction to a theoretical 
virtue trades a marker that is relatively clear with a marker that is 
problematically more vague. As Kuhn (1977) emphasized, throughout 
the history of science there is a substantial degree of subjectivity in the 
assessment of epistemic virtues like scope, simplicity, and explanatory 
power. Individual judgements differ, and community standards change 
over time. Thus, whether a theory has more or less explanatory or 
unifactory power than its competitors can be a point of disagreement 
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among scientists. Novel prediction is less contestable. The presence of 
successful novel prediction is more clearly assessable than explanatory 
power or unification even if there is disagreement about how strong a 
test the novel prediction provides. Take the example of quantum 
mechanics: It made successful predictions from the beginning, but the 
current assessment that it is explanatory arose partly because judgments 
about what is explanatory have matured in response to quantum 
mechanics. 
Third, critics of predictivism often presume an epistemic situation 
in which a theory is fully articulated and the theory’s structural virtues 
are transparent. Indeed, Collins insists that “the fundamental issue 
underlying the accommodation/prediction debate is whether or not the 
information that a theory predicted instead of accommodated a set of 
data should increase our confidence in its truth given that we already 
know the relevant structural/relational features of the theory” (Collins, 
1994, p. 215, our emphasis). As noted in the beginning of sec. 2, such 
perfect transparency of the relevant features of a theory is hard to come 
by in the midst of scientific practice. It is a philosophical idealization, 
so recommendations contingent on it provide no guidance for actual 
practice. In the flow of practice, because the structural features of a 
theory are never all transparent, novel prediction can provide useful 
assurance. 
Fourth, treating explanatory resources as features of a theory tout 
court ignores the important connection between explanation and 
prediction in the practice of science. Rather than being merely abstract 
features of a theory, explanatory resources are a crucial predictive 
resource, as noted in sec. 2.2 above. (And vice versa: Novel 
predictions, successful or not, provide grist for developing 
explanations.) 
Fifth, the theoretical virtues are primarily confined to one level of 
inference, the relationship between the theory and the phenomena. As 
we elaborated above, scientific inference also occurs in relating data to 
phenomena and in relating theory to frameworks. Novel prediction 
provides epistemic assurance at these levels of inference as well, as 
described in sec. 2.1 and 2.3. 
One might accept some of our objections and attempt to reframe 
Harker’s argument. If we cannot assess theoretical virtues directly, then 
we must use proxies. But why, Harker asks, should be use novel 
predictive success rather than other available proxies?  He writes, 
“Supporters of weak predictivist theses have done nothing to establish 
that the advantage of predictive success over accommodative success is 
any more reliable at tracking the epistemic virtues of a theory than 
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considerations pertaining to the reputation of the author, advocacy of 
the expert and so on” (Harker, 2008, p. 438). The argument is that 
predictive success, although some indicator of confirmatory virtues, 
might not be the best indicator available. Harker suggests that 
considerations of expertise might be better. 
Of course, this objection might well be decisive in some particular 
cases. We have only argued that predictive success can often do and 
typically does epistemic work. Yet Harker’s worry supposes that 
predictive success and expertise can, in general, be treated as separate 
indicators. Barnes’ argument (Barnes, 2008, discussed in sec. 2.3 
above) shows that this separation is untenable.18 A theory’s predictive 
success provides assurance for the framework which led to the theory, 
and some of this credit extends to the scientists who employed the 
framework, developed the theory, and endorsed the prediction. Because 
the framework involves tacit as well as explicit elements, this 
recognition of expertise cannot be eliminated in favor of purely formal 
confirmation of general theories. Novel predictive success interacts 
with expertise, and thus it would not be possible to jettison novel 
prediction while retaining considerations of expertise.19 
The kind of reduction proposed by Harker and Collins is not the 
only one in the field. Mayo (1996) attempts a different reduction of 
prediction’s virtues. She argues that novel prediction is only valuable 
because it is frequently associated with severe tests; that is, tests where 
the hypothesis under consideration would not have passed the test had 
the hypothesis been false. Novel prediction, on her view, is thus just an 
indicator for what really matters: viz., severe tests. Here too, the 
reduction fails for scientific practice. In order to assess whether a test 
was in fact severe, we need to account or control for all the sources of 
error. While this kind of assurance can be gained in controlled 
experimental contexts, it is much less clear how we are to achieve this 
in more complex contexts. Indeed, the applicability of Mayo’s 
approach to all of scientific inference is a central concern for her 
critics; see recent discussions by Achinstein, Musgrave, and Worrall (in 
Mayo and Spanos, 2010). Thus, the value of novel prediction across the 
full range of scientific contexts resists Mayo’s reduction. 
                                                
18 At minimum, Harker’s claim (Harker, 2008, cited above) that 
supporters of predictivism have nothing to say about the relation 
between novel predictive success and expertise is now false. 
19 In any case, the revised argument avoids at most the first three of 
the five worries about deflation that we raise earlier in this section. 
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3.2  Worrall’s Predictivism 
John Worrall has been one of the most original commentators on the 
value of novel prediction. Worrall’s view focuses on the assessment of 
theories and issues of parameter fixing. Within this context, he is 
concerned with the value of heuristic or use-novel predictions: the 
‘predicted’ claim might already be common knowledge, as long it does 
not figure in the actual construction of the theory. For Worrall, this is a 
logical rather than historical matter. In some sense, for Worrall, 
“novelty is not the issue at all” (Worrall 2002, p. 194). Importantly, 
timing is irrelevant. For example, Fresnel’s wave theory of light had 
one free parameter (wave length) which could be fixed using 
experimental data (measuring the wave length with which the scientist 
is working). With this parameter fixed, Fresnel’s theory could be used 
to derive other experimental results, such as straight-edge diffraction. 
Even though straight-edge diffraction was a known phenomena to 
Fresnel when he constructed his theory, the derivation of the diffraction 
pattern using the wave length and Fresnel’s theory counts as a use-
novel prediction. For Worrall, it is this kind of use-novelty which 
provides genuine empirical support to a theory, and nothing else does. 
Worrall maintains that accommodating data within a theory is 
appropriate given that we have independent reasons to accept the 
theory, and he holds that use-novel predictions provide those 
independent reasons. Thus, it is fine to use data to fix a specific 
parameter in a set of equations which are otherwise well motivated. Yet 
this motivation is conditional. Worrall explains, “Given that a general 
framework… is already accepted, then the data give… conclusive 
support” (Worrall, 2002, p. 203). (Here he means ‘framework’ to be 
something that is fully explicit, and so it is closer to what we here call a 
theory than what we call a framework.) In order to motivate accepting a 
theory, however, there must be some other kind of evidential support, 
and he suggests that there is a special value for predictions which were 
not exploited in constructing the theory itself. The special value of 
these use-novel predictions explains how evidence can justify 
accepting such a theory in the first place.20 
In one sense, Worrall’s predictivism is of the strongest sort, in that 
only use-novel evidence counts as genuine support for a theory. Yet, 
the structural aspects of Worrall’s view limit its applicability. Worrall’s 
view cannot be the whole story. First, it is too stark. Where it 
                                                
20 This is a long-running theme in his work. For a clear, recent 
statement, see Worrall (2002). 
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acknowledges a special value for prediction, it cannot allow 
accommodated evidence to count for anything. Second, applying it 
requires being able to clearly assess whether a prediction is use-novel. 
This requires a clear mathematical structure to a theory and a clear 
assessment of its parameters, clarity which is often lacking. So, despite 
its merits, Worrall’s account cannot be the whole story. Recognizing 
the value of novel prediction outside of the confines of Worrall’s view 
requires that we once again consider the temporal aspects of novel 
prediction, as we did in sec. 2. We add that temporal, endorsement 
novelty assures us of use-novelty, and so it provides the support that 
Worrall articulates in cases where we cannot independently assess use-
novelty. Strict use-novelty is hard to assess when parameters and the 
mathematical structure of the theory are not transparent, so true 
temporal novelty can provide the epistemic support Worrall seeks for 
less precise theories.  
There is a broader lesson here. Attempts to reduce the issue of 
predictivism to the logical structure of theories and evidence or 
particular epistemic virtues, often by demanding perfect transparency 
of evidential theory relationships, will miss precisely what is so 
valuable about predictions: When these things are obscure, when we do 
not know that we have accounted for all sources of error, then novel 
prediction provides the a useful epistemic assurance that we are on the 
right track. It is often only possible to characterize scientific success in 
precise terms long after it is a settled matter, so genuine novel 
prediction is an important resource in the flow of practice. 
4  Pluralist instrumental predictivism 
The survey provided here shows that prediction provides epistemic 
goods and additional assurance above and beyond accommodation at a 
number of points in scientific inference. For inferences from data to 
phenomena, from phenomena to theories, and from theories to 
framework, novel prediction provides distinct epistemic advantages. 
These epistemic assurances include: insurance against overfitting, 
evidential relevance to the explanatory structure of a theory, and 
reliable production of successful theories. In addition, novel predictions 
provide other epistemic goods, such as uncovering new relevant 
evidence and new evidence/theory relations. 
These assurances are all defeasible, but the point of epistemic 
assurance is not to be infallible. Rather, it is to indicate that our 
knowledge production is on the right track and likely to be reliable. 
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Novel prediction is neither a perfect warrant nor universally valuable, 
but rather it is commonly, locally valuable.  
As we have seen, some authors defend predictivism but consider 
predictive success to have just one function. We have cast our net more 
widely and have found more ways that predictions provides epistemic 
assurance. We make no claims to completeness, though. We have 
discussed the advantages of prediction under three headings, but we do 
not think of novel predictive success as having a perfect trinity of 
virtues. Predictions may be connected to the explanatory structure of a 
theory in several ways, for example, and so the advantages at the 
theory-phenomena boundary might themselves be numerous. 
The value of novel prediction is especially clear for inferences in 
actual, everyday science, because the complete structure of a theory 
under development is unavailable and because the features of a 
framework in use are not fully articulated and may remain tacit. Even 
though novel predictions are not a perfect assurance, and are not even 
optimally-assuring in all contexts, they often provide epistemic 
assurance that cannot be easily or feasibly bought in other ways. More 
philosophically-pure epistemic checks are often expensive or would 
require ideal circumstances. In contrast, for real cases, novel 
predictions provide a readily available and applicable epistemic check. 
For the state of incomplete knowledge in which epistemic actors 
actually find themselves, the assurance of novel prediction has clear 
advantages over attempting to assess the qualities of accommodation.  
Thus, novel prediction typically does give us reason to credit both 
the scientist who made the prediction and the representations used in 
making it. This reason is not because of an intrinsic feature of novel 
predictive success, but neither is it reducible to any one other 
dimension of confirmation. Novel success is typically an indication of 
numerous confirming factors. Attempts to make these indications 
superfluous will usually fail, both because there are so many disparate 
indications involved and because scientists are often unable to 
infallibly make direct assessment of them. Novel predictive success has 
an instrumental rather than an intrinsic value, but its typical 
instrumental value is sufficiently multifarious that no other tool can 
readily replace it. We dub this position Pluralist Instrumental 
Predictivism; PIP for short.21 We predict that developing the various 
                                                
21 We use ‘pluralist’ only to mean that there are many instrumental 
values for prediction, not to invoke any broader philosophical 
pluralisms. We use ‘instrumental’ only in opposition to ‘intrinsic’, 
not to suggest anti-realism about the prediction or theory. 
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advantages of prediction provides across a range of contexts will be a 
fruitful avenue for understanding scientific inference in practice.  
In sum, for scientific inference at various levels — from data to 
phenomena, from phenomena to theory, from theory to framework — 
novel predictions generally provide better epistemic assurance than 
accommodation. The epistemic assurance novel prediction provides, 
imperfect as it is, is of such general applicability in such a wide range 
of contexts and is so difficult to replace with anything else that novel 
prediction should be considered generally instrumentally valuable to 
scientific practice. Even if novel prediction is a surrogate in some cases 
for other strong sources of assurance (such as AIC in inferences from 
data to phenomena or severe tests in experimental contexts), it may be 
more readily available in particular cases and thus can still provide 
valuable epistemic assurance. The correct way to view the value of 
novel predictions is one of pluralist instrumentalism, acknowledging it 
as an important epistemic resource in scientific practice. 
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